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This move to lower-level properties that have fewer logical connections should not be seen 
as a new or disturbing change in four-dimensionalist theories of persistence.  Recall that person-
stages cannot have all sorts of important psychological properties anyhow, such as remembering 
where they were three years ago, or correctly believing that they will be at work at such-and-such a 
time next week.  Instead, many of these properties are already implicitly understood as lower level 
properties, even though memories are the only ones to have been explicitly redefined this way.  The 
poster child of this kind of logically restricted property is the quasi-memory.  ‘Quasi-thoughts,’ or 
properties that are explicitly defined to not imply personhood, should be no more threatening to a 
four-dimensionalist theory than quasi-memories, which explicitly do not imply identity.  Although 
many refined definitions of quasi-thoughts would allow these views to bypass the too many minds 
paradox,  the  simplest  would  define  quasi-thoughts  as  being  psychological  properties  which 
supervene only on the non-modal properties in the supervenience base of thoughts. 
We should accept this schema because it most accurately reflects our intuitions regarding 
personhood and consciousness, and because neither Olson nor Merricks have offered compelling 
argumentation to deny it. Shoemaker gives a similar claim, and motivates it via functionalism, but 
we can deny the problem of the too many minds even if we don't accept Shoemaker's functionalist 
account of the mind.
So,  regardless  of  our  beliefs  regarding  personal  identity,  survival,  and  personhood  in 
general, we can and should resist the problem of too many minds by restricting the ownership of 
psychological properties to persons only.
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Is It Reasonable For ‘Art’ To Have No 
Definition?
John Fluharty
The concept ‘art’ has no definition. It is open to interpretation and change; what is constituted as 
art is based on a range of rational reasons, contextually different between individuals and situations. 
I will show that Wittgenstein’s theories about aesthetics (different from family resemblances) were 
on the right path, and that Morris Weitz’s open concept view was flawed, but can be revived by 
cluster accounts, such as Berys Gaut’s. However, I will also show that Gaut was mistaken to give 
set criteria that constitute a highly disjunctive concept (definition) of art, but that rational reasons in 
an  epistemic  field  can  provide  individual  concepts  of  art,  allowing  for  an  explanation  to  the 
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vagueness in  defining art.  Thus,  I  shall  begin with the anti-essentialists  and move onto cluster 
accounts, finally finishing with a reason-based cluster account of art. 
1. Anti-Essentialism and Objections
Anti-Essentialist—or most simply—the view that art cannot be defined, emerged as a response to 
the Essentialist Functionalists—the dominant view in the first half of the century—who hold that art 
is  defined  by  most  often  one,  but  occasionally  more,  valuable  functions  that  it  fulfilsi.  Anti-
Essentialism has reminded us that the valuable functions of art change over time. It has its roots in 
Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblances, and asserts that there are no necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions that exclusively specify something as art. Weitz, in one of the most influential 
papers of the century in aestheticsii, claimed: ‘If we actually look and see what it is that we call 
“art”,  we will  find no common properties—only strands  of similarities,’1 because ‘logic  of  the 
concept’ precludes ‘art’ from having necessary and sufficient conditions.’2 ‘Aesthetic theory is a 
logically vain attempt to define what cannot be defined…to conceive the concept of art as closed 
when  its  very  use  demands  its  openness.’3 Naturally,  this  opened  up  the  floor  to  definitional 
responses with anti-essentialist elements such as: Institutionalists, Historical definitions, and hybrid 
theories.iii Before continuing with Weitz,  though, I shall  briefly look at Wittgenstein’s views on 
aesthetics.
Wittgenstein holds that not only can aesthetic conception not be defined necessarily and 
sufficiently, but aesthetic appreciation cannot be described; this would demand complete description 
of aesthetic environment—myriad language games applicable to actual aesthetic situations. More 
simply: there is no reason to speak of the comprehensiveness of the language we use and further 
aesthetic appreciation is a sign of aesthetic understanding though the grammar of ‘understanding’ is 
spread across a intricate practice of aesthetic appreciation; no single aesthetic appreciation exhibits 
itself. There is no single means of aesthetic appreciation.4 Philosophical aesthetics should be a form 
of grammatical investigation with our diverse interaction with art. This is threefold: ‘(i) drawing 
attention to the actual situation in which aesthetic judgements are being made (whether we agree or 
disagree, and about what, and why); (ii) proceeding by making comparisons between the occurrence 
of our aesthetic judgement and other language games as a means for drawing attention to the actual 
situation; (iii) trying to make one see the aspect, which is constitutive of the actual situation; that is, 
to notice that  an interpretation is  given as a description of an  experience [my italics],  and that 
assenting signifies, not the exchange of information, but […] finding one another (in language).’5 
Weitz’s view developed over three main essays: ‘The Role of Theory in Aesthetics’ (1956), 
‘Wittgenstein’s Aesthetics’ [1973], and The Opening Mind [1977].6 Let me summarize his view that 
emerged over several years:
1 Pg 125, Weitz, Morris, ‘Role of Theory in Aesthetics’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 15 (1956), pp. 27-35; reprinted in Philosophy 
Loots at the Arts: Contemporary Readings in Aesthetics, ed. Joseph Margolis, rev edn (Philadelphia: Temple U.P. 1978)
2 Pg 126, Ibid
3 Pg 122, Ibid
4 Pg 299, Gunter, Eran, ‘Critical Study: An Inadvertent Nemesis—Wittgenstein and Contemporary Aesthetics’ British Journal of Aesthetics Vol. 45 
No. 3 July 2005
5 pg 300, Gunter, Eran, ‘Critical Study: An Inadvertent Nemesis—Wittgenstein and Contemporary Aesthetics’ British Journal of Aesthetics Vol. 45 
No. 3 July 2005
6 Weitz, Morris, The Opening Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), Weitz, Morris, ‘Role of Theory in Aesthetics’, Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 15 (1956), pp. 27-35; reprinted in Philosophy Loots at the Arts: Contemporary Readings in Aesthetics, ed. Joseph 
Margolis, rev edn (Philadelphia: Temple U.P. 1978), and Weitz, Morris, ‘Wittgenstein’s Aesthetics’ in Benjamin R. Tilghman (ed.), Language and 
Aesthetics, (Lawrence: The University of Kansas Press, 1973)
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1) some empirically descriptive and normative concepts are open and some are closed
2) open concepts are open in a variety of logically distinguishable ways
3) open concepts enrich thought and discourse by serving conceptual functions that could 
not be so served if those concepts were closed
4) at least some, if not all, types of open concepts are always open 
5) an open concept which is always open, such as a perennially flexible concept like ‘art’ 
or a perennially debatable concept like ‘tragedy’, is always open because of its function 
or use and its corresponding logic or logical grammar.7
The problem with Weitz’s theory should be apparent from the start. Relying on a concept of family 
resemblances  leads  to  a  vacuous  definition;  everything  does  and  can  be  made  to  resemble 
everything else in some shape or form. It follows then that simple resemblances should not be used 
to explain why a concept cannot be defined.8 A further problem with Weitz’s theory is that of art as 
‘open concept’, which directly follows from having a family resemblance theory.iv Definitions, it is 
held by Weitz, apply only to closed objects; though, for example, 'family' can maintain as closed, 
though the members are changed , even by those unrelated by blood, i.e. adoption.
It has also been objected that Weitz misunderstands Wittgenstein, who has several different 
versions of family resemblance: e.g. ‘language’, ‘chair’, and ‘number’. They all have an element of 
vagueness, but also have different employment in language. Fredrich Waismann coined the term 
‘open-textured  concept’  to  refer  to  the  recurrent  dubitability  appended  to  the  conditions  of 
application  of  certain  concepts.9 The  similarity  between  Waismann  and  Wittgenstein  is  that 
anticipation of the application of certain concepts is impossible, and the conditions of application 
are uncertain. Wittgenstein, though, believes there are other ways for a concept to be open: (i) there 
are cases in which there are no rules of application, (ii) there are cases impossible to anticipate 
application, (iii) the concept of games, such as the one Weitz uses, , involves vague boundaries or 
blurred edges. To connect this with Weitz; Weitz does not distinguish the various kinds of open 
concepts. Art is open textured in all three senses, though Weitz compares art to ‘games’, which is 
open in only one sense.10 Thus, an anti-essentialist definition should explicitly state which open-
concept ‘art’ falls under, and why.
Furthermore points (4) and (5), above, give Weitz the most trouble, and indeed, he fails to 
answer questions such as ‘What are concepts?’ And ‘What is it to have concepts?’.11 Weitz uses the 
terms ‘logic’ or ‘logical grammar’, to imply a ‘use-pattern’—or corresponding pattern of use—of 
open concepts. He is wrong to imply that use-patterns guarantee a concept is always open; functions 
and use patterns change over time.12 Unfortunately, Weitz gives little support for this assumption. 
The ability of the concept ‘art’ to change over time needs to be explored, as well as the prospect of 
any unchanging features. Without, some sort of evidence of unity or a ‘deep-seeded’ structure in the 
concepts of artwork, open concept theories of art look vacuous and susceptible to collapse. 
Following  from  this  discussion,  four  clear  objections  to  Weitz  emerge:  (i)  family 
resemblances can lead to a vacuous account of art, (ii) closed definitions can take on new defining 
characteristics, (iii) Weitz is ambiguous as to which ‘open concept’ he supports, and (iv) he fails to 
explain what a concept is or what it means to have one.
7 Pg 38, Kamber, Richard, “Weitz Reconsidered: A Clearer View of Why Theories of Art Fail”, British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol 38, No. 1. January 
1998
8 This and other objections can be found in: Davies, Stephen, Definitions of Art (Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), Chapter 1.
9 Waismann, Fredrich, “Verifiability,” The Aristotelian Society for the Study of Philosophy, Supp. Vol. 19 (July 1945): 119-50
10 pp 2-9 Scalafani, Richard, ‘’Art’, Wittgenstein, and Open-Textured Concepts’, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Spring 
1971)
11 pg, 39 ramber, Richard, “Weitz Reconsidered: A Clearer View of Why Theories of Art Fail”, British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol 38, No. 1. January 
1998
12 Pg 39, ibid
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2. Reviving Anti-Essentialism and Cluster Accounts of Art
To maintain an anti-essentialist theory these objections must be answered. Richard Kamber asserts 
that it is correct to be sceptical about the possibility of a theory to reveal the continued unity of art 
over time; the mistake comes in assuming there is an essential openness or disunity in concepts of 
art. Weitz’s scepticism is shared, but not his analysis. Kamber’s analysis is threefold: first, art is an 
umbrella concept such as contemporary users cannot agree on a necessary condition for something 
being an artwork; second, if contemporaries did show a necessary conditions for something’s being 
an artwork, it would need to show the property is a result of deep structure; finally, no theory has 
made this case yet. There is no deep structure connection.13 
Kamber reinvents Weitz by throwing out the open concept solution and replacing it with an 
umbrella concept, which simply claims that the concept of art keeps encompassing new dimensions. 
This  would  seem to  help  objection  on  (ii),  though  not  the  others.  Berys  Gaut,  however,  has 
identified a necessary condition for art, and handles objections (i)-(iv) well, while still maintaining 
there is no definition of art.
Gaut argues that art is not a resemblance-to-paradigm construal (something is art by virtue 
of resembling paradigm art-works) such as Weitz’s theory suggests, but rather a cluster construal to 
family resemblance that gives correct characterization of art. The argument rests on counterfactual 
cases of supposed art objects rather than the importance of originality in art. Wittgenstein indeed 
developed a cluster account, from family resemblances, of the meaning of proper names. Weitz’s 
resemblance-to-paradigm model leads to his vacuous account; the cluster account avoids this by 
stating criteria.14 This route, also would be supported by Wittgenstein’s direct views on aesthetics, 
stated  above—in  which  he  holds  that  there  is  no  single  means  of  aesthetic  appreciation,  but 
aesthetics should form an investigation of interaction with art—as well as supported by Kamber’s 
umbrella concept.
A cluster account ‘is true of a concept just in case there are properties whose instantiation by 
an object  counts  as  a  matter  of  conceptual  necessity toward its  falling under  the concept.  The 
properties, called criteria, are simply the possession of a property which is a necessity of an object’s 
being a concept.15 Gaut gives several reasons why a criterion counts towards a concept:
1) if all of the properties that are criteria are instantiated, this suffices for an 
object to fall  under the concept;  and more strongly,  if  fewer than all  of 
these properties are instantiated, this also suffices for the application of the 
concept. So there are jointly sufficient conditions for the application of the 
concept. 
2) there are no properties that are individually necessary conditions for the 
object to fall under the concept (that is, there is no property that all objects 
falling under the concept must possess)
3) there are disjunctively necessary conditions for application of the concept. 
By the second point, it follows that if a concept’s meaning is given by a 
cluster  account,  one  cannot  define  that  concept,  in  the  sense  of  fixing 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for it.16
Indeed, there is a logical difference separating the resemblance-to-paradigm accounts from clusters; 
cluster  accounts  appeal  to  general  properties  to  explain  the  relevant  features,  resemblance-to-
paradigm accounts explain them by resemblance to particulars. 
Gaut appeals to Wittgenstein to define the contents of his cluster account. “Don’t think, but 
13 pg 44-45 ibid
14 pg 275, Gaut, Berys, "The Cluster Account of Art Defended", British Journal of Aesthetics, 45, 2005, pp. 273-88.
15 pg 273, Gaut, Berys, " The Cluster Account of Art Defended", British Journal of Aesthetics, 45, 2005, pp. 273-88.
16 Pg 27, Gaut, Berys, "'Art' as a Cluster Concept", in Theories of Art, Noël Carroll (ed.), University of Wisconsin Press, 2000, pp. 25-44.
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look!”17 This is simply an appeal to look at how art is used in language, to which, Gaut concludes 
that art must challenge the intellect rather than being merely just for pleasure. Gaut then gives us a 
list to help define what he think should count towards an objects being art: ‘(i) possessing positive 
aesthetic  qualities  (I  employ the  notion  of  positive  aesthetic  qualities  here  in  a  narrow sense, 
comprising beauty and its subspecies); (ii) being expressive of emotion; (iii) being intellectually 
challenging; (iv) being formally complex and coherent; (v) having a capacity to convey complex 
meanings;  (vi)  exhibiting  an  individual  point  of  view;  (vii)  being  an  exercise  of  creative 
imagination; (viii) being an artefact or performance that is the product of a high degree of skill; (ix) 
belonging to an established artistic form; and (x) being the product of an intention to make a work 
of art.’18 Having a list, as such, yields a concept that is noncircular. 
Furthermore, Gaut gives a necessary condition for something’s being an artwork: action. 
Each one is a product of action, and importantly, selection (such as found art) is a form of action. 
Selection as a work of art adds to properties of something, or changes them, ‘a piece of driftwood in 
nature cannot express despair,’19 but selection can give it  that  qualityv.  This identifies that deep 
structure of art, to which Kamber asserts as important. I shall now turn to some of the objections 
that have been made by Thomas Adajian, and Gaut’s responses, but concentrate more on Robert 
Stecker’s claim that Gaut’s cluster theory is a disjunctive definition of art, incognito. I shall then 
bring up some objections of my own.
Adajian  objects  that  Gaut’s  cluster  account  is—because  it  appeals  to  Wittgensteinian 
positions of family resemblance—not any better than definitions of art. Moreover, by leaving his 
cluster  account  open to revision,  Gaut appears  to contradict  himself  by denouncing definitions, 
while holding a concept that is a disjunctive definition. In parallel, simply because a definition has 
not been pinned down, does not mean there is not one, however it can be responded that using a 
cluster  theory sidesteps many of the problems for definitions. Gaut concedes that the epistemic 
version of the argument fails, though a heuristic one holds, based on reasonable search principles. 
Stecker argues that Gaut’s cluster account is really just a disjunctive definition in disguise:
If the concept of F is a cluster concept, then there are several different sufficient conditions 
for being an F, no conditions are individually necessary for being an F, that is, there is no 
condition  that  all  the  Fs  must  satisfy,  and  finally,  there  are  disjunctively  necessary 
conditions for being an F, that is, it must be true that if something is F, then it satisfies one 
or another of the sufficient conditions for being F.20
However, for an F to have these characteristics, it would be true of F that it is disjunctively defined. 
What makes Gaut’s version distinct from other disjunctive definitions, is that, whether something is 
a  sufficient  condition  to  qualify  as  art,  is  indeterminate.  Further,  there  are  no  set  numbers  of 
disjunctive conditions. One response is to affirm that his definition is not conjunctive, and draw a 
distinction  between  highly  disjunctive  and  variegated  definitions  and  simple  disjunctive  and 
conjunctive  definitions,  and  we find  that  there  is  not  a  correct  definition  of  art  that  is  simple 
disjunctive. Thus simple disjunctive and conjunctive definitions are defective. Highly disjunctive 
theories have many disjuncts.21 What must be explored now, is the candidate account.
Let us explore the ten criteria that Gaut proposes in the candidate account for an object to be 
art. Stating specified criteria that an object—which is considered to change in form over time—
must  fulfil  to  constitute  it  as  that  thing  is  flawed.  Many things  that  are  not  art,  with  simple 
disjunctive definitions can fulfil Gaut’s criteria: the games of chess, for example, would fulfil i-viii; 
that is, it is beautiful, graceful and elegant to watch (or play); it can express emotion for the players; 
is intellectually challenging; complex; each move or strategy has meaning; it exhibits an individual 
17 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, part 1, 66
18 pg 274, Gaut, Berys, "The Cluster Account of Art Defended", British Journal of Aesthetics, 45, 2005, pp. 273-88.
19 Pg 29, Gaut, Berys, "'Art' as a Cluster Concept", in Theories of Art, Noël Carroll (ed.), University of Wisconsin Press, 2000, pp. 25-44.
20 Pg 48, Stecker, Robert, ‘Is it Reasonable to Attempt to Define Art?’, in Theories of Art, Noël Carroll (ed.), University of Wisconsin Press, 2000
21 Pg 286, Gaut, Berys, "The Cluster Account of Art Defended", British Journal of Aesthetics, 45, 2005
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point of view; exercises creative imagination; and it is part of a performance. A sexual experience 
could  fulfil  most  criteria  as  well,  especially  an  early  sexual  experience  which  could  prove 
intellectually challenging. The only two chess does not fulfil are (ix) and (x), specifically (ix) which 
begs the question:  What are the established art  forms and who decided they are established?vi 
Furthermore, (x) being a product of intention to make a work of art undermines a subcategory of 
Gaut’s necessity of  action: selection. Selecting something in nature as art, does not constitute the 
making of a work of art, and it certainly was not intentional for nature to make it as art. Further, 
action, seems unimportantly necessary; action denotes that something is being created (or selected) 
but  does  not  give  a  defining  characteristic.  Moreover,  note  that  (ii-vi)  all  are  forms  of 
communication, something I will come back to.
Gaut’s theory allows for some of the criteria to be objected; not all criteria must be filled to 
constitute  something  as  art.  The  criteria  in  the  cluster  are  necessary disjunctive.  However,  the 
example of the chess game or sexual experience shows that lists can be flawed. Set criteria, strictly 
necessary,  or  loosely  necessary,  do  not  work  for  constituting  an  open  concept.  Moreover,  is 
disjunctive necessity rationally possible? Necessity involves a condition an object must meet to be 
considered that object, though a set list of criteria that art must necessarily fulfil some (different 
ones for each art object) to be considered art, begs the question: Are any of them really necessary? 
We can  formulate  this  discussion  into  a  few clear  objections  to  the  cluster  account:  (I)  More 
concepts than art fulfil a substantial number of criteria; (II) (ix) begs the question and (x) self-
contradicts the necessity of action; (III) are highly disjunctive definitions based on a set of criteria 
rationally possible?
3. Reason-based Clusters
I  suspect  the  cluster  account  can  be  saved,  though,  without  a  set  list.  Gaut  states  that  certain 
qualities give reason to constitute an object as art. Can  reason be exploited to give support to a 
cluster account? I think it can. Drawing on ideas about rational reasons in relation to a subject, or 
actor,  a contextual and subjective concept of art  can be built  up to help prevent Gaut’s  cluster 
account from collapsing without a set  list.  To begin,  we can distinguish three types of reasons: 
practical, epistemic, and evaluative reasonsvii.
• He has reason to feel proud of himself: despite all the pressure on him he won the match.
• That electrician has failed to turn up again! Yes, you have some reason to be annoyed 
with him.
• Freda has good reason to be resentful about the way she was treated22
I shall focus mainly on the epistemic reason, which can be applied to theories of art:
• I have reason to think Frank Gehry’s Guggenheim is art: it is beautiful, graceful, and 
elegant.
Reasons can be seen as a fact in a ‘non-committal, formal or nominal way, in which facts can be 
simply  equated  with  true  propositions,  propositions  being  understood  as  information-contents, 
Fregean thoughts’23 Actions, beliefs, and feelings are intentionally linked to their accountability as 
reasons. Moreover, reasons are facts that stand in relation to an actor, and reasons can be strong or 
weak based on the number of facts: 
Thus R, the reason relation we’re considering, holds between a plurality of facts, an 
actor, an act-type, a degree of strength of the reason, and a time: 
The facts pi are at time t a reason of degree d for x to ϕ.
R(pi, t, d, x, ϕ)24 
22 pg 1 Skorupski, John, ‘The Unity and Diversity of Reasons’ Unpublished
23 pg 2 Skorupski, John, ‘The Unity and Diversity of Reasons’ Unpublished
24 pg 3 Skorupski, John, ‘The Unity and Diversity of Reasons’ Unpublished
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Therefore:
R (The facts that the Guggenheim is beautiful, graceful, and elegant are at this time a 
reason of good degree for me to believe it is art.)
Before we move on, I must clarify the concept of degree of strength. Reasons can be of varying 
degrees of strength. This is certainly one of the problems that plagues concepts of art. Definitional 
theories struggle because of the vagueness of some items to be considered art. Having reason that is 
context dependent, yields an explanation to this vagueness. It explains, rather easily, how something 
is called art at one time by one person and not at another time by another person. This can be 
refined by pointing out that most if not all knowledge of what art is is a posteriori. It comes from 
experiencing how the term is used: “Look, don’t think!”. One further element of reasons I would 
like to explore are epistemic fields. Epistemic reasons are relative to a field which contain facts, the 
strength  for  the  belief  depends  on  other  facts  in  the  field.  The  field  can  be  enlarged  as  more 
information  becomes  salient;  likewise,  facts  can  be  overwritten  as  new ones  become  salient.25 
Importantly, we need a notion of rationality to prevent a vacuous theory.  If we have a reason to 
believe something is art—that is not forwardly rational—than perhaps that can allow anyone to dub 
anything  as  art  without  good  reason.  Thus,  we  can  introduce  a  concept  of  rationally  self-
determining actors, who can assess reasons to believe or feel by their own reflection. They decided 
whether they should do more investigation, or have sufficient reason to believe. This is called self-
audit. There are warrantable reasons, open to self-audit obtained by reflection. These warrantable 
reasons are held within the epistemic field, called the epistemic state. ‘The fact that  p is in x’s 
epistemic state at t if and only if26:
i) x could come to believe, at t, that p, simply by attention to the fact that p without 
any further action, and
ii) in an epistemic field of x’s that contains the fact that p that very fact is sufficient 
reason for x to believe that p, whatever other facts obtain in the field’27
Thus, we can see that experience coupled with rational thinking can lead to good epistemic reasons 
to believe some set of relations to an actor. I believe this can be applied to a cluster theory to yield 
an anti-essentialist definition of art able to side step all of the objections yet raised. Let me try to put 
this theory into a set of premises:
i) There are no necessary and sufficient conditions that specify something as art
However
ii) Art used as cluster account such that there are properties whose instantiation by 
an object counts as a matter of conceptual necessity (set by individual warranted 
rationality) towards its falling under the concept.
iii) There is no universal list of properties
iv) There are, instead, individual clusters set by epistemic reasons subjective to an 
individual
v) Reasons are factual propositions that stand in relation to an actor and vary in 
degrees of strength
vi) Factual propositions come through experience
vii) Epistemic reasons about what constitutes something as art are relative to a field 
of facts obtained through experience, which can expand or be self-audited by 
rational deliberation
Therefore,
The concept of art has no objective necessary and sufficient conditions, but rather, is made 
up of a cluster of individually necessary subjective properties set by a posteriori facts in 
25 pg 6, Skorupski, John, ‘The Unity and Diversity of Reasons’ Unpublished
26 All these ideas on reason originate from Skorupski, John, ‘The Unity and Diversity of Reasons’ Unpublished
27 Pg 9, Skorupski, John, ‘The Unity and Diversity of Reasons’ Unpublished
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relation to that subject, from which, rational deliberation give the subject warranted rational 
reason to constitute something as art.
Art, then, is instantiated as anything a rational agent believes it to be, in so far as he has rational 
reason to believe it.  This proves a contextual definition, and is faithful to other anti-essentialist 
positions. It changes over time; holds true to the three types of open concept based on the reasons 
we use them in language; the epistemic field of reason yields a cluster  of facts  with which to 
constitute  an  object  as  art.  It  also  explains  indeterminacy of  disjunction  by  showing  different 
subjects have a different field of epistemic reasons to constitute an object as art; moreover it is not a 
highly disjunctive because there is no set list of instantiation.  Furthermore, the objections raised 
against Weitz’s original theory are satisfied by this definition where open concepts are based on 
experience in art’s use in language, rationalized by warrant. Moreover, it  satisfies the epistemic 
challenge against the cluster account, as well by avoiding a set list of criteria, and the disjuncts.
4. Conclusion
The majority of Gaut’s cluster criteria were based on communication, as was Wittgenstein’s account 
of aesthetics based on grammatical investigation experience of interaction with art. Basing rational 
reasons on the interaction of the construct of ‘art’ in language seems the  rational course. It fully 
covers all the set objections brought against the anti-essentialists by taking them head on, or side 
stepping  then.  Thus,  due  to  the  vagaries  of  experience  and  use  of  ‘art’ we  find  there  are  no 
necessary and sufficient conditions to define it. ‘Art’ is open to take on new meaning. Therefore, 
there is no definition of art. 
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include: Dickie,  George,  Art  and the Aesthetic:  An Institutional  Analysis (Ithaca,  N.Y.:  Cornell University 
Press, 1974); and Diffey, T.J., “The Republic of Art” The Republic of Art and Other Essays (New York: Peter 
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counterfactual cases: if the account claims that some object satisfies the concept, but it intuitively doesn’t (or 
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(2) normatively adequate: some intuitions that do not fit the proposed account may be rejected: there will be a 
reflective equilibrium between the account and intuitions[…]it must include a theory of error: some account 
must be offered of why people have the mistaken intuitions they do. 
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Wisconsin Press, 2000, pp. 25-44.
vi. For example, Roger Scruton argues against Photography (which many would take to be an established art 
form) as an art form in: Roger Scruton, “Why Photography is Not Art,” in Golblatt and Brown, op. cit., p. 90
vii. All  explanations  of  reason in  this  section are  drawn from: Skorupski,  John,  ‘The Unity and  Diversity of 
Reasons’ Unpublished.  They can  applied  to  concepts  of  art  to  explain  many of  the  problems  with  anti-
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Interview with Simon Prosser
(Conducted on 3rd June 2008. Interviewer: Joe Slater).
Joe Slater: It’s common knowledge among your students that you were originally a physicist.  At 
what point did you “see the light,” as it were, and come to philosophy?
Simon Prosser: Not while I was still doing physics. I often get asked how I started off in physics 
and got into philosophy. It’s not something uncommon, actually. There are quite a few philosophers 
who did either physics or mathematics at  first.  I  think it’s  because in the case of people doing 
physics they’re often interested in the big questions about space and time and the universe and so 
on. Certainly what happened in my case was just that I mis-located the things that I was interested 
in. I thought physicists were the people who addressed the really big questions about those topics, 
and it took a long time to realise that actually what physicists do is mainly mathematics; figuring 
out things that are specific to the actual world. So I did my physics degree feeling that something 
wasn’t right, but I didn’t know what. I even started a Masters degree and had a conditional offer of a 
PhD place before I finally had to accept that physics wasn’t really the thing for me, but I didn’t 
know what I did want to do at that time. I had done just one very short philosophy of science course 
during my physics degree, so I had just a little idea about what philosophy was. It seemed to come 
very naturally to me, but it  took a couple of years after  finishing with physics before I  finally 
decided that I should come and study philosophy properly. Because things hadn’t really worked out 
with the physics I was very cautious about it, so I did a one-year conversion course, a postgraduate 
diploma. I went into it  thinking “well,  just be very careful and see how this goes.” But I very 
quickly realised that I was very, very keen.
J: You’ve been a member of staff here at St Andrews since 2002?
S: That’s right.
J: What attracted you to St Andrews in the first place?
S: Well, to be honest, the job situation in academia generally and certainly in philosophy is such that 
you often don’t have much of a choice, especially at first, so if I’m completely honest what brought 
me here initially was the fact that they offered me a job. Every time a job is advertised loads and 
loads of people apply. But I was very happy to get a job here because it’s an exceptionally strong 
department. In surveys that people respect it’s usually rated in the top two or three departments in 
the UK. And I always wanted to live by the sea. I’m very happy about that too.
J: Are you likely to still be here in a few years time, or are you planning to move on...?
S: No plans to move anywhere at the moment. I think I like the place more and more as time goes 
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